Deficits, interest rates, and the tax distribution by S. Rao Aiyagari
A Shred of Evidence on Public Acceptance 
of Privately Issued Currency 
Martin S. Eichenbaum 
Neil Wallace (p. 2) 
Deficits, Interest Rates, 
and the Tax Distribution  S. Rao Aiyagari (p. 5) 
Reprints 
Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
Some Pleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
A Reply to Darby 
Thomas J. Sargent 
Neil Wallace (p. 15) 
Michael R. Darby (p. 32) 
Preston J. Miller 
Thomas J. Sargent (p. 38) 
1984 Contents  (P. 44) Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review vol. 9, no. i issn 0271-5287 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving policymaking 
by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Preston J. Miller, Richard M. Todd, Kathleen S. Rolfe, and Inga Velde. 
Graphic design by Phil Swenson and typesetting by Barbara Cahlander and Terri Desormey, Graphic Services Department. 
Address requests for additional copies to the Research Department, 
Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480. 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1985 
Deficits; Interest Rates; 
and the Tax Distribution 
S. Rao Aiyagari 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
University of Wisconsin 
and Visiting Assistant Professor 
Graduate School of Industrial Administration 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
What is the relationship, if any, between higher govern-
ment deficits and interest rates? Do permanently higher 
deficits necessarily imply that real interest rates will rise? 
Or can higher deficits be financed by more government 
borrowing without crowding out private capital, driving 
up interest rates, and producing high inflation? These 
questions have been addressed in three articles published 
previously in the Quarterly Review and reprinted in this 
issue. (See Sargent and Wallace 1981, Darby 1984, and 
Miller and Sargent 1984.) Missing from the earlier 
discussion, however, is adequate consideration of the role 
played by the distribution of taxes among economic 
agents. This paper attempts to highlight that role by 
showing that if the distribution of taxes is allowed to vary, 
it is feasible to finance a larger deficit by borrowing 
without affecting the interest rate. Moreover, it is not the 
level of the deficit per se but the distributional impact of its 
financing that may affect interest rates and hence the 
ability to finance the deficit by borrowing. 
The Debate Thus Far 
Before going further, let us briefly review the main points 
of the earlier articles. Sargent and Wallace (1981) 
consider an economy with a constant real growth rate y 
where the government attempts to finance a given deficit 
(defined as the excess of government consumption £ over 
taxes r, both per unit of output) with money and interest-
bearing bonds. They show that if the real interest rate on 
bonds r exceeds the growth rate (r > y), then a policy of 
fixed money growth may be infeasible. For if the sum of 
direct taxes and the inflation tax on money falls short of 
government consumption, then the level of bonds per unit 
of output will grow without limit and will exceed the 
disposable income of savers. Consequently, the only 
choice for monetary policy is when to monetize the debt 
rather than whether. Using Samuelson's (1958) overlap-
ping generations model, Sargent and Wallace construct 
some illustrative examples in which they show that a tight 
monetary policy maintained for some time and then 
followed by monetization of the debt may lead to 
uniformly higher inflation than a more accommodative 
policy held for the same length of time and followed by 
debt monetization. 
In his response to Sargent and Wallace, Darby (1984) 
argues that if the real interest rate on bonds is less than the 
economy's real growth rate (r < y), then the government 
earns positive seignorage on bonds and never needs to 
deviate from a policy of fixed money growth. (Seignorage 
is revenue the government earns from issuing money and 
bonds.) Since Darby finds that empirical evidence for 
the U.S. economy over the period 1926-81 favors his 
assumption, he concludes that the Sargent-Wallace argu-
ment is not empirically relevant. 
In their reply to Darby, Miller and Sargent (1984) 
argue that historical evidence from a given regime of 
average deficits associated with the real interest rate being 
less than the real growth rate does not mean that the 
Sargent-Wallace argument is irrelevant. They point out 
that in an economy where the real interest rate depends on 
(among other things) the deficit, a change to a different 
5 regime involving higher deficits per unit of output may 
well push the real interest rate above the growth rate. 
When this happens, the monetarist arithmetic of Sargent 
and Wallace will indeed be unpleasant. Miller and 
Sargent argue that the rather large deficits projected for 
the U.S. economy over the near future may well be 
indicative of such a regime change. 
Highlighting the Tax Distribution 
Missing in the debate thus far is a discussion of the 
importance of the distribution of taxes.
1 To see its 
importance, we can relate this discussion to Wallace's 
(1981) analysis of open market operations. Wallace 
shows that open market operations will not affect either 
real or nominal variables under the following conditions: 
a. The time path of government consumption 
is unchanged 
b. The time path of the deficit (defined as inclusive 
of interest payments and inflation-tax receipts) 
is unchanged. 
c. The distribution of wealth among agents 
is unchanged. 
In general, condition b implies different time paths for 
total direct taxes and hence different time paths for the 
deficit (defined as government consumption minus direct 
taxes). And yet, real or nominal variables need not be 
affected.
2 
This contrasts with Miller and Sargent's (1984) 
analysis in which such a result does not obtain. In their 
analysis, higher deficits will change the real interest rate 
and may well make it greater than the real growth rate 
even if initially (under a different deficit regime) the real 
interest rate is less than the growth rate. The key to this 
difference is condition c, the distribution of wealth among 
agents, which in turn depends on the distribution of the 
total tax burden. In the Miller-Sargent analysis, the distri-
bution of taxes across generations is fixed; consequently, 
changes in deficits induce changes in lifetime wealth dis-
tributions and interest rates. However, if a change in the 
deficit is accompanied by a change in the distribution of 
taxes such that the wealth distribution is maintained, then 
interest rates need not be affected. 
Assumptions and Propositions 
In order to highlight the importance of the tax distribution 
in this debate, I need to use an economic model where the 
arguments of the earlier articles apply and where the tax 
distribution can be examined. For these reasons, I will 
work with a version of Samuelson's (1958) overlapping 
generations (OLG) model that is similar to the one used 
by Sargent and Wallace (1981).
3 
Using this model, I will demonstrate that under certain 
conditions the interest rate need not be affected by a 
change in the deficit. I first assume that government 
consumption exceeds total direct taxes. Then, without 
loss of generality, I assume that the growth rate is zero and 
construct an equilibrium in which the real interest rate is 
negative. (This is consistent with Darby's assumption, 
r < y with y = 0). In the context of my model, I then prove 
the following propositions: 
1 In the ensuing discussion, keep in mind that deficit is defined as government 
consumption minus direct taxes; interest payments on the debt and the inflation tax 
on money are not counted. This definition is consistent with the usage in the 
previous articles. 
2It should be stated that my analysis is different from Wallace 1981. The 
deficit policies examined here are not just asset exchanges. Government con-
sumption may be different, which must lead to changes in private consumption, 
although it may or may not affect interest rates. 
31 have selected an OLG model because this type of model can yield a real 
interest rate that may be above or below the real growth rate and can vary with 
different deficit policy regimes—so Darby's and Miller-Sargent's arguments 
would apply. Moreover, OLG models have heterogeneous agents, so taxes can be 
distributed differently among them. It also seems clear to me that the authors' 
previous discussion is carried out in the context of heterogeneous agent models. 
Sargent and Wallace 1981 contains examples of heterogeneous agent economies 
with overlapping generations in which the distribution of taxes across agents 
clearly matters. Finally, the model referred to in Miller and Sargent's reply (and 
described in Miller 1982) is also an OLG model. 
For a number of reasons, I did not select another type of model commonly used 
to analyze the effects of deficit polices—that is, representative, infinitely lived 
agent models. In this type of model, all agents are identical, so the tax distribution 
can't be varied among different agents. Moreover, the real interest rate cannot be 
below the growth rate (r < y), so neither Darby's argument nor part of Miller-
Sargent's counterargument would apply. In addition, in this type of model (at least 
within the class where the representative agent has a constant rate of time 
preference), the interest rate is fixed, so Miller-Sargent's argument that higher 
deficit regimes result in higher real interest rates wouldn't apply. 
These points about representative, infinitely lived agent models can be 
demonstrated in the following way: In such models, the economy consists of a 
representative, infinitely lived family which maximizes /W(Cf), where Ct is 
total consumption, U( •) is the utility derived in period t, p is a discount factor, and 
0 < p < 1. If rt is the real interest rate from t to /+1, then a necessary condition for 
utility maximization is 
MRS(Ct, C,+1) = V(Ct)/mCt+l) = 1 + r, 
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between Ct and Cr+1. As an 
example, suppose that U(C) = In C and that a steady-state solution exists where 
C,+1 = (1 +y)Ct, so that the economy is growing at the rate y. Then the steady-
state interest rate r is given by 
1 + r=c,+1//*Q = (i+y)/0. 
Since 0 < p < 1, it must be that r > y and, further, that the steady-state value of r 
is independent of the government's budget policies. 
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•A higher level of government consumption with 
unchanged total taxes can be financed by debt alone 
at an unchanged real interest rate. 
• A lower level of total taxes with unchanged govern-
ment consumption can be financed by debt alone at 
an unchanged real interest rate. 
(For simplicity of argument, the propositions are solely 
concerned with debt finance; fiat money is not included in 
the model. The Appendix shows that fiat money can be 
included without affecting my conclusions.) 
The Model 
Here I describe the OLG model selected. I consider an 
economy with a constant population composed of agents 
who live for two periods. I assume that at each time 
t(= 1,2,...) a single agent is born (the young at t) who is 
endowed with w units of a nonstorable commodity at t and 
who has no endowment in the second period.
4 The old 
agent at t, who was born at t~ 1 and is now in his or her 
second (final) period, has dt units of government bonds, 
each of which represents a claim to one unit of time t 
consumption. I use the following notation: 
g = government consumption 
(assumed to be constant over time) 
cs(t) = consumption at t of the agent born at date s 
Ts(t) = lump-sum taxes at t on the agent born at date s 
a\nct(t) + (1— a)lnc,(H-l) = the utility function of the 
agent born at t\ 0 < a < 1 
rt =the real interest rate on government bonds 
from t\ot+\. 
The government budget constraint is 
(1) g + d, = r,_,(0 + r,(0 + [dl+l/(l+r,)]. 
This says that government consumption and the debt 
obligation to the old agent at time t must be met by 
taxes on the old agent at t, taxes on the young agent at 
t, and the proceeds of new bond sales to the young at t. 
The young agent at t maximizes utility, subject to the 
following lifetime budget constraint: 
(2) cjit) + [c,(/+l)/(l+r,)] 
= r,(0 - [r/m)/(l+r,)]. 
Given the log-linear specification of the utility function, 
the consumption demands for the young agent are given 
by 
(3) c,(t) = a{w - z,(t) - [r,(/+l)/(l+r,)]} 
(4) c,U+l) = (l-a)(l+r,) 
X{w- T,(t) - [r,(r+l)/( l+Oll. 
The old agent at time t cashes in bond holdings dp pays 
taxes zt_x(t), and consumes the rest. So the old agent's 
consumption demand is 
(5) ct_x(t) = dt- rt_x(t). 
The consumption demands of the young agent (3)-(4), 
the old agent (5), and the government g, all at time t, 
must satisfy the economy's aggregate resource con-
straint at t: 
(6) ctf + c^W+g-w. 
By virtue of (1), (3), and (5), the above equilibrium 
condition can be rewritten as 
(7) dt+l/(l+rt) = w-rj(t)-ct(t) 
= (l-a)[w-r,(0] 
+ [ar,(f+l)/(l+r,)]. 
This says that the savings of the young agent at time t 
(the agent's endowment less current taxes and con-
sumption) must equal the market value of debt sold by 
the government at t, since holdings of government debt 
are the only form of savings available for young agents. 
Equations (1) and (7) describe the sequence of 
interest rates and government debt, given some assump-
tions about taxes and debt supplies. First, suppose that 
(8) TjLt) = Tl9 t= 1,2,... 
(9) Vl(0 = r2, t= 1,2,... 
4 Sargent and Wallace (1981) allow for storage with constant returns to scale. 
The real return on bonds then cannot fall below the return on storage, though it may 
rise above the return on storage. I exclude storage so that the real interest rate is free 
to change with the policy regime. 
7 and d{ is taken as an initial condition. Then the solution 
is described by the following equations: 
may be offset by a change in the distribution of taxes in 
such a way that the interest rate does not change. 
(10) 1 + r,= aT2/[(g-T-T2) + dt - (1 -OXW-TJ] 
(11) d^ = az2[(g-T-T2) + dt] 
+ [(g-T-T2) + dt-(l-aXn-Tl)]. 
We now make two assumptions: 
(12) 0 < r2< [(g-Tx)/(l-a)] - (W-tx) 
(13) w > g > tx + v2. 
Under these assumptions there exists a positive, locally 
stable fixed point d to the difference equation (ll).
5 
This may be seen by putting dt = dt+l = d in (11) and 
solving for d. This leads to the following quadratic 
equation in d: 
(14) d
2 + d[g -tx-t2-(1 -aXw-rJ - ar2] 
~ OCT2(g-T-T2) 
= 0. 
By virtue of (12) and (13), it can be shown that equa-
tion (14) has one negative root, which is not economi-
cally relevant, and one positive root d, which can be 
shown to be locally stable.
6 From (10) and (11) we also 
have 
(15) I + r = dt+l/(g-T-T2+dt). 
The steady-state interest rate r associated with the posi-
tive root d of (14) is therefore given by 
(16) 1 + r = d/{g-z-z2+d) < 1. 
Hence, r < 0. 
It can be seen from (14) that d depends not just on 
total taxes (zx + r2) but also on the distribution of total 
taxes across the young and the old agents. Consequent-
ly, from (16) it follows that the interest rate r also 
depends on this distribution. Thus, it is possible that an 
increase in government consumption g with no change 
in total taxes (so that the deficit is permanently higher) 
Increasing Government Spending 
Without Changing Total Taxes or Interest Rates 
I now use the model to demonstrate my proposition that 
government consumption can be increased (g'>g as 




Tx+T2) by issuing more debt (d' > d) at an unchanged 
interest rate (r' = r). 
Suppose that initially the economy is in a steady 
state with d and r given by (14) and (16). Let#', and 
T!2 be new levels of government consumption and taxes 
where 
(17) w>g'>g 
(18) < = r, + (g'-g)/r{l - [ar/(l+r)]} 
(19) = r2 - {g'-g)/r{ 1 - [ar/(l+r)]}. 
Obviously, t?x + tf2 = rx + r2, so there is no change in 
total tax receipts. However, the distribution of the tax 
burden is different. The new policy calls for reducing 
taxes on the young and increasing taxes on the old (note 
that r < 0). It can be verified that this scheme leads to 
the same steady-state interest rate as before (namely, r) 
and to a higher level of government debt. Stability of 
the difference equation system for government debt and 
the interest rate is guaranteed if a > 0.5 for any g' > g. 
(Of course, we must have^' < w.) This can be verified 
by checking that conditions (12) and (13) continue to 
hold for g\ z
fl, and r2. (Figures 1-3 illustrate the 
solution.) 
The tax scheme (18) and (19) has the property that 
it distributes the burden of financing the higher level of 
government consumption equally between the young 
and the old, in the sense that the wealth distribution 
between young and old is unaffected. If we let(cl5c2) be 
the steady-state consumption allocations between the 
young and old, then in the original equilibrium 
5Locally stable means that if the initial level of debt d{ is not too far from d, 
then the sequence of debts determined by equation (11) always converges to d, as 
t becomes large. 
6 Proofs of this assertion and others in this paper are contained in a Technical 
Appendix available on request to the Research Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis. 
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Figures 1-3 
Increasing Government Spending With 
the Same Total Taxes (r^+r'g = T,+T2) and Interest Rate 
Figure 1 Higher government spending reduces 
feasible consumption allocations, given 
the economy's aggregate resource constraint, 
Ci + o2 + g = w. 
Figure 2 At the same interest rate, the new tax 
distribution reduces an agent's consumption, 
given the agent's budget set, 














New Budget Set ^Budget Set 
(w, 0) First-Period 
• > Consumption 
Figure 3 The equilibrium interest rate is unchanged 
with higher government spending and 





New Market Equilibrium 
__ Market Equilibrium 
j (Agent maximizes utility 
and aggregate resource 
constraint is satisfied.) 
(w, 0) First-Period 
> Consumption 
9 (20) Crajw-r.-Ml+r)]) 
(21) c2=(l-a)(l+r){w - r, - [r2/(l+r)]}. 
Equations (20) and (21) are simply the steady-state 
versions of (3) and (4). In the new equilibrium, since r 
is the same, we have 
(22) = 
(23) c'2 = (l-a)(l+r){w - < - [^/(l +r)]}. 
Noting that in a steady-state equilibrium the wealth of 
the old agent is simply equal to that agent's consump-
tion, we get 
(24) (^-rr[r2/(l+#2 
= {w - < - K2/(l+r)]}/c'2 
= l/[(l-a)(l+r)]. 
This shows that the ratio of the wealth of the young 
agent to that of the old agent is unchanged. In this 
sense, the wealth distribution is unaffected by the higher 
deficit, and the interest rate is unchanged. The relation-
ship in (24) also shows that if the interest rate is dif-
ferent under two different deficit regimes, the wealth 
distribution must also be different. That is, it is not 
possible to affect interest rates without affecting the 
wealth distribution.
7 
Cutting Taxes Without Changing 
Government Spending or Interest Rates 
I now demonstrate my proposition that, for a given level 
of government consumption g, it is possible to finance a 
higher deficit resulting from lower total taxes (r"+ r2 < 
T\ +
 t2) by issuing more debt (d" > d) at an unchanged 
real interest rate (r" = r). As in the case with increased 
spending, the idea is to distribute the tax cut between the 
young and the old in a way that does not affect the wealth 
distribution and hence does not affect the interest rate. 
Suppose that the economy is initially in a steady state 
with d and r given by (14) and (16). Consider the follow-
ing alternative tax scheme that holds government con-
sumption fixed: 
(25) r'/= rx + {Mr) 
Figure 4 
Cutting Total Taxes (t"+t2 < r-i+r2) 
Without Changing Government Spending 
and the Interest Rate 
Consumption 
(26) r2 = r2 — (l+r)(Ar/r) 
where Ar > 0. Obviously, 
(27) r'/ + r2= tx + r2 - Ar < vx + r2. 
This tax scheme keeps the wealth of a young agent 
unchanged at the previous interest rate, since 
(28) r'/ + [r2/( 1 +r)] = r, + [r2/( 1 + r)]. 
Hence, first-period consumption will be unaffected. But 
since first-period taxes are lower (because r < 0) by 
equation (25), savings will increase by — Ar/r. This 
increase in savings will accommodate exactly the addi-
tional debt that has to be issued to finance the tax cut, 
and the interest rate will be unaffected. This is simply 
the Ricardian doctrine (which says that the choice be-
tween tax and debt financing of government spending 
7 This result parallels the result in models with representative, infinitely lived 
agents in which increases in government spending simply crowd out consumption 
one-to-one but do not affect the steady-state interest rate or the capital stock. The 
difference here is that because of the OLG framework, the interest rate can be 
positive or negative. 
10 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1985 
For Every Deficit, Taxes Can Be Distributed Sw 
Second-P 
My overlapping generations model can also be used to
 Consuc
mf 
demonstrate that for each new deficit, there is a way to dis-
tribute taxes such that the new equilibrium interest rate 
remains less than zero. Suppose that a constant stream of 
government consumption g and total taxes r are given such 
that w > g > r. Then there exists a distribution of total taxes 
among the young and the old [zt(t) and Tt_x(t), respectively, 
such that zt(t) -1- Tt_{(t) = T] which will support a competitive 
equilibrium with a negative real interest rate and a positive 
level of debt. (The construction of such an equilibrium is 
depicted in the accompanying figure.) Thus, in the face of a 
changing deficit, even if the old interest rate cannot be sus-
tained as an equilibrium, it is always possible to sustain a 
new—and still negative—equilibrium interest rate without 
changing the new level of total taxes. 




— Balanced Budget 
\ ff-'i+fj 
—\ -V— Deficit Spending 
W \ 9 > r,+r2 
\\ Changing Tax Distribution 
\\for Total Taxes r 
Market Equilibrium 
\ Initial 
\ \ Endowment 
\ \ (w, 0) First-Period 
• > Consumption 
After-Tax Endowment^
 c> 
(W-ZV-TJ . Budget Set 
does not affect interest rates and consumption alloca-
tions) in an OLG framework where the tax cut is dis-
tributed among the agents in a way that does not affect 
wealth distributions. (Figure 4 illustrates the solution. 
In fact, a stronger conclusion can be demonstrated in 
the context of my OLG model, as shown in the ac-
companying box.) 
Conclusion 
I conclude that the proper argument for the monetarist 
arithmetic debate seems to be that it is not higher deficits 
per se that may alter the interest rate but, rather, how the 
burden of financing these higher deficits is distributed 
across heterogeneous agents. Equation (21) shows that 
the ratio of the wealth of the old agent, which is simply 
that agent's consumption c2, to that of the young agent, 
w — z{ — [r2/(l+r)j, is related only to the interest rate. 
Consequently, as long as the distribution of wealth is 
unchanged across alternative equilibria, the interest rate 
cannot change.
8 
According to my model, the Miller-Sargent conclu-
sions (that a shift to a different regime with permanently 
higher deficits will raise the interest rate and may make it 
exceed the growth rate) do not follow when the distribu-
tion of wealth is held constant. The model shows that a 
higher level of government spending can be financed by 
debt alone at an unchanged (and negative) interest rate 
and with unchanged total taxes, provided the distribution 
of the tax burden is adjusted to maintain wealth distribu-
tions. In the model, this requires reducing taxes on savers 
(the young) and increasing taxes on dissavers (the old), 
but leaving total taxes unchanged. Thus, any actual effect 
of higher government spending on interest rates may arise 
because distributional impacts are not being controlled 
for and not simply because the deficit is higher. Similarly, 
a cut in total taxes can be financed by debt alone at an 
unchanged (and negative) interest rate, provided taxes are 
cut (and raised) on individuals or groups in a manner that 
precludes distributional impacts. In the model, this 
requires cutting taxes on savers and raising taxes on 
dissavers to maintain the wealth distribution. Here again, 
any actual effect of tax cuts on interest rates may arise 
because distributional impacts are not being controlled 
for and not just because the deficit is higher. 
In the Sargent and Wallace article as well as Miller 
and Sargent's, the authors implicitly assume that not 
only are total taxes fixed but that taxes on each indi-
vidual or group are also fixed. Thus, alternative levels 
does not affect interest rates and consumption alloca-
tions) in an OLG framework where the tax cut is dis-
tributed among the agents in a way that does not affect 
wealth distributions. (Figure 4 illustrates the solution. 
In fact, a stronger conclusion can be demonstrated in 
the context of my OLG model, as shown in the ac-
companying box.) 
Conclusion 
I conclude that the proper argument for the monetarist 
arithmetic debate seems to be that it is not higher deficits 
per se that may alter the interest rate but, rather, how the 
burden of financing these higher deficits is distributed 
across heterogeneous agents. Equation (21) shows that 
the ratio of the wealth of the old agent, which is simply 
that agent's consumption c2, to that of the young agent, 
w — z{ — [r2/(l+r)j, is related only to the interest rate. 
Consequently, as long as the distribution of wealth is 
unchanged across alternative equilibria, the interest rate 
cannot change.
8 
According to my model, the Miller-Sargent conclu-
sions (that a shift to a different regime with permanently 
higher deficits will raise the interest rate and may make it 
exceed the growth rate) do not follow when the distribu-
tion of wealth is held constant. The model shows that a 
higher level of government spending can be financed by 
debt alone at an unchanged (and negative) interest rate 
8Obviously, it is also possible to have alternative equilibria with identical 
deficits and different wealth distributions and hence different interest rates. This 
can be obtained by simply changing the distribution of total taxes between the 
young and the old. Recall that from (14) and (16), the steady-state level of debt and 
the interest rate depend also on the distribution of taxes. 
11 of the deficit correspond to alternative levels of govern-
ment consumption. However, if an increase in the 
deficit is due to a cut in total taxes with unchanged 
government consumption, then presumably the tax cut 
is made in some fashion to all individuals each period. 
In either case, the wealth distribution will be affected 
and, along with it, the interest rate. When the deficit is 
higher, maintaining the wealth distribution requires a 
change in the distribution of taxes, in which case the 
interest rate need not change. The Sargent-Wallace and 
Miller-Sargent assumption about taxes may be more 
relevant for the recent across-the-board tax cuts than 
my own assumption of taxes being raised on one group 
while being lowered on another. Nevertheless, this 
should not detract from my theoretical point that it is 
not the level of the deficit per se but the distributional 
impact of its financing that may affect interest rates and 
hence the ability to finance the deficit by debt alone. 
Thus, the level of the government deficit is a very 
inadequate measure of the impact of government budget 
policies on interest rates. Higher deficits can be asso-
ciated with higher, lower, or unchanged real interest 
rates by suitably manipulating the wealth distribution 
through the tax system without affecting total taxes. As 
a result, we cannot, in general, draw a connection be-
tween aggregate measures of government activity and 
interest rates without considering the distribution of 
wealth. Thus, when the real interest rate is less than the 
real growth rate (or, in my analysis, when the real 
interest rate is negative, since I assume the growth rate 
is zero), higher deficits need not raise interest rates and 
impair the government's ability to use debt finance. 
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Appendix: 
Adding Money to the 
Overlapping Generations Model 
To simplify my argument about the importance of the tax 
distribution for the discussion of deficits and interest rates, I 
omitted money from the overlapping generations (OLG) model 
used in my analysis. But it is not difficult to include money in 
the model, as is shown here. First, I show that when money is 
substituted for government debt, my two propositions still 
hold. Second, I show that when both money and bonds are 
included in the model, the propositions hold as well. 
The Model With Money Only 
Even though the OLG model does not contain money, it has 
the following (possibly surprising) implications for money 
finance of the deficit: 
•An increase in government consumption with un-
changed total taxes can be financed by money creation 
alone at an unchanged inflation rate. 
•A cut in total taxes with unchanged government con-
sumption can be financed by money creation alone at an 
unchanged inflation rate. 
It is not difficult to understand these results if we remember 
that a positive level of government debt with a negative real 
interest rate is equivalent to a positive level of real money 
balances and a positive inflation rate. We simply assume that all 
government debt is in the form of fiat money, of which the initial 
old agent has M0 units. We then identify government debt dt 
with M(_l/p[ and the interest rate 1+r, with pt/pt+{, where 
pt is the price level at time t. The government budget constraint 
(1) assumes the form 
(Al) g = r,_i(0 + r,(f) + [(M, - M,_,)//>,]. 
Then, under the same assumptions as before, namely (12) and 
(13), there will exist a stationary monetary equilibrium with 
(A2) Mt_l/pi = d 
and 
(A3) p/pl+l=l+r. 
Given M0, equation (A2) with t = 1 determines the initial 
price level. The inflation rate (which will be positive, since 
r < 0) is given by (A3); it determines the entire price se-
quence. The money supply path is determined by (Al) or 
(A2). The propositions about debt finance in my analysis can 
now be translated in terms of money finance. 
The Model With Money and Bonds 
Fiat money can also be easily included with government bonds 
in the OLG model without affecting my conclusions. I do this in 
a manner that parallels Sargent and Wallace 1981.1 assume 
that in each period another agent is born who has y units of 
endowment in the first period and none in the second period. 
The old agents at date 1 hold M0 units of money (in addition to 
government bonds), and the government pursues a policy of 
fixed money growth, denoted by 6: 
(A4) Mt = (1+0)M,_P t= 1,2, 
I then assume that w > > y, so that the second agent is much 
poorer than the first; that bonds are large-denomination obli-
gations which the poor agent cannot afford (but the rich can); 
and that 
(A5) l+r> 1/(1+0). 
That is, the real return on bonds is greater than the real return on 
money. Finally, I assume that intermediation between large-
denomination bonds and small-denomination currency is 
prohibited and that the poor agent never faces any taxes. Under 
this scenario, the markets for money and bonds will be com-
pletely segmented—that is, the rich hold bonds and the poor 
hold money. 
Assuming that the poor agent has the same preferences as 
the rich, the demand for real balances is given by 
(A6) demand = (1—a)y = MJpt = supply. 
In combination with (A4), the time path of price levels is 
determined by 
(A7) pt = (1 +0)Mr_1/( \—oc)y, t= 1,2,.... 
The government budget constraint is modified to 
(A8) g + d= zt(t) + Vl (0 + [dt+l/( 1+r,)] 
+ [(M,-M,_1)//>,]. 
13 Or, equivalently, 
(A9) {g - [d(l-a)y/(l+d)]\ + d, 
= r,(0 + v.W + K+1/(i+01-
This is essentially the same as constraint (1), except what was 
previously referred to as government consumption should now 
be reinterpreted as the excess of government consumption over 
the inflation-tax receipts from money creation. However, since 
none of that analysis involved changing 6 or taxes on the poor 
agent, the results hold. 
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